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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
FRANK ROBERTSON, ) 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : 
-vs- ) Case No. 14538 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, : 
De fendant/Appe1lant. ) 
* * * * * * * 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
* * * 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff filed suit seeking to recover the sum of 
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) from Defendant 
on grounds that the Defendant was negligent in transmitting said 
funds by wire from Murray, Utah to Boise, Idaho. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
A jury trial was held before the Honorable Jay E. Banks, 
a Judge of the Third Judicial District, on February 24, 1976. 
Judgment was entered in favor of the Plaintiff and against the 
Defendant in the sum of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($16,500.00). The judgment was entered pursuant to Plaintiff's 
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motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence, 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Commercial Security Bank seeks: (1) reversal of the 
judgment entered in favor of the Plaintiff and dismissal of 
said cause of action or (2) requests the case be remanded to 
the lower court for a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Pharos Enterprises, a fertilizing company, was a debtor 
of the Plaintiff, Frank Robertson, and Carl Harrison in the sum 
of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00). (R6). 
Pharos Enterprises maintained a business checking account at 
the Murray Branch of Commercial Security Bank and on August 8, 
1974 Pharos issued a check drawn on that account in the sum of 
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00), made payable 
to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison", as joint payees. 
The check was properly endorsed by both joint payees 
and deposited by Robertson in the new Plymouth Branch of the 
Bank of Idaho. (R28). It did not clear and was returned to 
Robertson who contacted Harrison (an officer of Pharos) about 
making it good. 
It was endorsed again, (see Exhibit 3-D) upon the 
representation that it would be paid, and sent direct to Commercial 
Security Bank with directions, apparently from Harrison, to wire 
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the funds to Bank of Idaho at Boise. Pharos made the check 
good by bringing in a cashiers check. 
The Murray Branch of Commercial Security Bank telephoned 
its home office located in Ogden, Utah and requested the Ogden 
office, which handled all wire transfers to send the sum of 
Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500.00) to "F. 
Robertson and C. Harrison". Commercial's correspondent bank was 
Continental Bank and Trust in Salt Lake City and Continental 
Bank and Trust was a member of the Federal Reserve System while 
Commercial Security Bank was not. Thus, the matter of transfer 
of funds through Continental contemplated a clearing of these 
funds through the Federal Reserve System to the Bank of Idaho at 
Boise. Commercial Security Bank forwarded a credit memo to 
Continental Bank and Trust for transfer of such funds. (Exhibit 2-D). 
Continental Bank and Trust then prepared a debit memo (Exhibit 1-D) 
which was forwarded to Commercial Security Bank and a remittance 
advice through Federal Reserve requesting wire of the funds 
to F. Robertson or C. Harrison at Bank of Idaho, Boise (Exhibit 4-D). 
During transmission of the funds through Continental, 
the word "and" was changed to "or", so the memo read "F. Robertson 
or C. Harrison11 rather than "F. Robertson and C. Harrison". 
Advice as to the funds being received was apparently given to 
Mr. Harrison and he called for them. The sum of Sixteen Thousand 
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Five Hundred Dollars ($16,500„00) was paid directly to Carl 
Harrison at the Bank of Idaho in Boise, Idaho. Carl Harrison 
failed to pay any of the funds to the Plaintiff, Frank Robertson. 
Frank Robertson subsequently filed suit in Third District 
Court to recover the total sum of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($16,500.00). Based upon the evidence, the trial judge 
found in favor of the Plaintiff pursuant to a motion for directed 
verdict. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT CARL HARRISON WAS 
NOT AN INDISPENSABLE PARTY TO THE SUIT. 
As a general rule of law where two or more persons are 
listed as joint payees on a negotiable instrument, their joinder 
as parties in the suit is both proper and necessary. 10 C.J.S. 
"Bills and Notes", Section 553 (c) states: 
Where a bill, note or check is made payable to several 
persons or is endorsed or signed by several, they are 
joint holders and not only may, but must, sue jointly 
as such. (Emphasis added). Id. 1179. 
Also see Underwood v Otwell, 153 S.E. 2d 40 (1967). 
In the case at bar, the negotiable instrument had been 
made payable to the Plaintiff, Frank Robertson, and Carl Harrison, 
as joint payees in the sum of Sixteen Thousand Five Hundred 
Dollars ($16,500.00). The Plaintiff, Frank Robertson, while 
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testifying at first that Carl Harrison had no interest in the 
original check and he did not know why Carl Harrison's name was 
on the check, nevertheless indicated later that the funds properly 
should have been transmitted by wire subsequently in the names of 
F. Robertson and C. Harrison in the same fashion as the original 
check. (R36-37). Based on the testimony of Frank Robertson, 
the trial court ruled that Carl Harrison had no beneficial 
interest in the check. (R23). The Appellant, Commercial 
Security Bank, contends that the trial court erred in holding 
that Carl Harrison had no beneficial interest in the funds and 
therefore Carl Harrison was not an indispensable party to the 
suit. 
Commercial Security Bank contends that where a negotiable 
instrument is made payable to joint payees, both payees on the 
negotiable instrument are indispensable parties to the cause of 
action. One (1) joint payee cannot establish ownership of the 
proceeds without including the other payee in the law suit and 
having that payee testify as to ownership. 
The rule of law is that a negotiable instrument made 
payable to joint payees can be discharged only by both parties. 
Section 70 A-3-116 U.C.C. states: 
An instrument payable to the order of two or more 
persons: (b) if not in the alternative, is 
payable to all of them and may be negotiated, 
discharged or enforced only by all of them. 
(Emphasis added). 
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The official comment to Section 3-116 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code (Uniform Laws Annotated) Master Edition, Volume 
II, states that both payees must be included in any action to 
enforce the negotiable instrument. 
PURPOSES OF CHANGE: The changes are intended to make 
clear the distinction between an instrument payable 
to fA or B1 and one payable to 'A and B1. The first 
names either A or B as payee, so that either of them 
who is in possession becomes a holder as that term is 
defined in Section 1-201 and may negotiate, enforce 
or discharge the instrument. The second is payable 
only to A and B together, and as provided in the 
original section both must endorse in order to 
negotiate the instrument, although one may, of course, 
be authorized to sign for the other. Likewise, both 
must join in any action to enforce the instrument, 
and the rights of one are not discharged without his 
consent by the act of the other, (Emphasis added). 
Id. 49. 
Since Carl Harrison was not made either a party Plaintiff 
or a party Defendant in this action and since the negotiable 
instrument was made payable to both Frank Robertson and Carl 
Harrison, the Appellant contends the trial court's ruling con-
stitutes reversible error. 
In the case of F. R. Orr Construction Company v Ready 
Mixed Concrete Company, 472 P. 2d 193 (1970), the Colorado Court 
of Appeals held that where a negotiable instrument was made 
payable to joint payees it could not determine the actual interest 
or ownership of the check without the presence of both payees. 
In that case a check in the sum of Two Thousand Nine Hundred Four 
6-
and .13/1.00 ($2,904.13) Dollars had been issued to Ready Mixed 
Concrete Co. and Terry Construction Company, as joint payees. 
Ready Mixed failed to obtain the endorsement of Terry and could 
not cash the check. Ready Mixed then sued Orr and Terry Construc-
tion Company to recover the full amount of the check. Terry 
Construction Company was never served with legal process as 
the Plaintiff was unable to locate anyone from Terry Construction 
Company. The Defendant, Orr Construction Co., moved to dismiss 
the complaint on the grounds that Terry Construction Company was 
an indispensable party to the case and the court could not determine 
ownership of the funds without including Terry Construction Company 
in that suit. The trial court denied Defendant's motion to dismiss 
and further held that the Plaintiff was entitled to recover the 
full amount of the check. Defendant appealed. The Colorado 
Court of Appeals reversed the trial court decision and held in 
favor of the Defendant. The Court of Appeals said that if could 
not determine the interest of Terry Construction Company without 
its presence in the case. The Plaintiff had asserted that under 
the circumstances of the case it was the holder of the non-
negotiable chose in action and the trial court could properly 
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determine that the non-endorsing co-payee had no interest in 
the proceeds represented by the check. That was the same 
argument which is raised in the case at bar by the Plaintiff. 
Frank Robertson testified that Carl Harrison had no interest 
in the proceeds of the check. (R8). The trial court agreed 
with the Plaintiff, and held that Carl Harrison had no interest 
in the check and therefore was not an indispensable party. 
The Colorado Court of Appeals rejected this same argument, 
however, when it said: 
Under the facts before us, the court could not 
determine the interest of Terry without its 
presence in the case. R.C.P. Colo. 19 (a); 
Woodco v Lindanhal, 152 Colo. 49, 380 P. 2d 
234; Wencr v Schleicrer, 130 Colo. 90, 273 P. 2d 
356. The proper procedural steps to bring Terry 
before the court for a determination of its 
interest were not taken since it was not a party 
Plaintiff and since it was not a "Defendant because 
of a failure of service of process. There is no 
evidence on which the trial court could find any 
enforceable debt or contract flowing between 
Plaintiff and Defendant for which the latter 
could be held liable; and no other theory to 
sustain the suit has been advanced. The trial 
court, in effect, rewrote the check. The 
judgment entered by the trial court is in error 
and is reversed with direction to dismiss the 
complaint. Id. 195. 
The Appellant contends that F. R. Orr Construction 
Company is directly on point. In that case and in the case 
at bar the Plaintiffs argued that the joint payee had no interest 
in the proceeds represented in the check. In both cases the 
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trial court held that the joint payee in fact had no interest 
in the check and therefore was not an indispensable party. 
Appellant submits that under the facts of this case the trial 
court could not determine the interests of Carl Harrison without 
his presence in the case. 
In Hinoiosa v Love, 496 S.W. 2d 224 (1973), the Texas 
Court of Appeals held that in cases where a promissory note was 
made payable to joint payees, then both parties were considered 
to be indispensable in the suit. In that case a promissory note 
had been made payable to E. V. Love and the National Bank of 
Commerce of Brownsville, as joint payees. The note had been 
issued by Mr. L. L. Hinojosa. The note was subsequently not 
honored and Mr. Love sued Mr. Hinojosa to recover full payment. 
Mr. Hinojosa failed to respond to the complaint and the default 
judgment was entered for Mr. Love. Mr. Hinojosa then moved for 
a new trial which was later denied. Mr. Hinojosa appealed the 
decision and contended that since two (2) payees were listed on 
the promissory note, both party payees were indispensable parties 
to the suit. The Texas Court of Appeals held that the National 
Bank of Commerce of Brownsville was indeed an indispensable party 
and should be joined in the suit. Citing Section 3-116 U.C.C. 
and Rule 39 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court of 
\ppeals concluded that "Proceedings in the absence of an 
-9-
indispensable party was fundamental error". The judgment of 
the lower court was reversed and the case was remanded for 
trial. 
Rule 19 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure discusses 
joinder of necessary parties. 
(a) NECESSARY JOINDER. Subject to the provisions of 
Rule 23 and of (b) of this rule, persons having a joint 
interest shall be made parties and be joined on the 
same side as Plaintiffs or Defendants. When a person 
who should join as a Plaintiff refuses to do so, where 
his consent cannot be obtained, he may be made a 
Defendant, or in proper cases, involuntary Plaintiff. 
(b) EFFECT THE FAILURE TO JOIN. When persons who are 
not indispensable, but who ought to be pairties if 
complete relief is to be accorded between those already 
parties, have not been made parties and cire subject to 
the jurisdiction of the court as to service of process, 
the court shall order them summoned to appear in the 
action. The court in its discretion may proceed in 
the action without making such persons, parties, as 
such jurisdiction over them can be acquired only by 
their consent or voluntary appearance; but the judgment 
rendered therein does not affect the rights or lia-
bilities of absent persons. 
(Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure concerns 
class action suits). 
Carl Harrison was not joined in the suit as a party 
Plaintiff because Frank Robertson said he could not locate Mr. 
Harrison (R43) and because he believed Mr. Harrison to be judgment 
proof. It would have been a relatively easy thing for Plaintiff 
to have sued Mr. Harrison in Idaho and come armed to Utah with 
a judgment against Carl Harrison which would have determined the 
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ownership of the proceeds. 
Based on the cases cited above, Appellant submits it 
was reversible error for the trial court to rule that Carl 
Harrison was not indispensable to the suit. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR PLAINTIFF. 
A motion for directed verdict is governed under Rule 
50 (a) U.R.C.P. and is usually granted only where the court is 
convinced that reasonable minds could not differ as to the 
evidence. When a motion for a directed verdict is made, the 
trial court is required to view the evidence in light most 
favorable to the party against whom the motion is made. In 
Anderson v Gribble, 30 U. 2d 68, P. 2d 432 (1973), the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
The motion, although labeled a non-suit, was a 
motion for a directed verdict under Rule 50 (a) 
U.R.C.P. Upon a motion for a directed verdict, 
the trial court is obligated to view the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the party against 
whom it is directed. This court will sustain 
the granting of a motion only if the evidence 
were such that reasonable men could not arrive 
at a different conclusion. 
(Also see Smith v Thornton, 23 U. 2d 110, 458 P. 2d 870 (1969); 
Rhiness v Dansie, 24 U. 2d 375, 472 P. 2d 428 (1970). 
Commercial Security Bank submits that if the evidence in 
this case were viewed in a light most favorable to the Bank, then 
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reasonable men could differ as to the conclusion reached and 
therefore, the motion for a directed verdict was in error, 
though we submit the indispensable party argument should have 
disposed of the case. 
An examination of the evidence clearly leaves a question 
in one's mind. Robertson testified that Harrison had no interest 
in the proceeds and he had no idea why his (Harrison's) name 
was on the check (R8, R30). He also testified that Harrison's 
name should properly have been on the subsequent remittance 
in whatever form that might have taken (R37). Louis N. 
Sylvester, Jr., an assistant treasurer and C.P.A. for Pharos 
testified that John Smith, President of Pharos, told him to 
make the check payable to both Robertson and Harrison (R50). 
The reason given was that John Smith wanted Harrison to realize 
the check was a final settlement. (R51). No further explanation 
was given. The Plaintiff, Robertson, did not testify as to any 
instructions he gave the bank as to how any remittance should 
be made out or delivered. He had no conversation with anyone 
representing the defendant bank until some time after Harrison 
had received the funds. John Mallacher, Vice President of the 
bank, told of two phone calls. The first, advising that the first 
Pharos check had not cleared, and the second, a request to wire 
the funds but not in any particular manner (R53). The calls, he 
-12-
said, could have been from either party. 
When the first check bounced, it was returned to 
Robertson who turned it over to Harrison for further handling 
after each endorsed it again. Robertson had nothing further 
to do with the matter relying on Harrison to bring him the 
funds. 
The record indicates that Pharos Enterprises was 
a debtor of both Frank Robertson and Carl Harrison (R6). 
If the money had been paid to Frank Robertson only, who is to 
say that the bank might not now be facing a suit at the hands 
of Mr. Harrison. This was the dilemma confronting the bank 
when the matter of ownership was in question, and all parties 
not before the court. 
It is Appellant's contention that since it was never 
clear why both names were listed on the check, the jury should 
have been given the opportunity to determine if the Plaintiff 
was entitled to keep all of the proceeds or only a portion 
thereof. Since several explanations were offered and since 
the evidence should be viewed in a light most favorable to 
the Bank, Appellant contends that reasonable minds could differ 
and therefore, the directed verdict should not have been granted. 
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POINT III 
A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT MADE PAYABLE TO JOINT PAYEES IS 
ENFORCEABLE ONCE THE INSTRUMENT IS PROPERLY ENDORSED BY 
BOTH PAYEES. DELIVERY TO ONE IS DELIVERY TO BOTH. 
The general rule of law is that a negotiable instrument 
made payable to joint payees can be discharged only by both 
parties. Section 70 A-3-116 U.C.C. states: 
An instrument payable to the order of two or more 
persons: (b) if not in the alternative is payable 
to all of them and may be negotiated, discharged 
or enforced only by all of them. 
Since the negotiable instrument in this case was made 
payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison", it could only be 
negotiated, discharged and enforced by both payees. Section 
70 A-3-202 U.C.C. defines "negotiation" as: 
Negotiation is the transfer of an instrument in such 
form that the transferee becomes a holder. If the 
instrument is payable to order, it is negotiated by 
delivery with any necessary endorsements; if payable 
to bearer, it is negotiated by delivery. 
(3) An endorsement is effective for negotiation only 
when it conveys the entire instrument or any unpaid 
residue. If it purports to be of less, it operates 
only as a partial assignment. 
The rule of law set forth in the Uniform Commercial Code 
states that an instrument made payable to joint payees must 
be negotiated by both payees. This act of negotiation is 
accomplished when the instrument is properly endorsed by both 
payees. The Utah case law supports the proposition that a 
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negotiable instrument made payable to joint payees must be 
endorsed by both payees. In Pacific Metals Company v Tracy-Collins 
Bank and Trust Company, 21 U. 2d 400, 446 P. 2d 303 (1968), the 
Supreme Court held that the Defendant bank was liable for 
honoring a check which was made payable to joint payees but 
which was endorsed only by one payee. In that case, the check 
was made payable to the Plaintiff and to Olympus Heating as 
joint payees. The Defendant bank honored the check upon the 
endorsement of Olympus Heating only, without the endorsement of 
Plaintiff. Plaintiff brought suit against the Defendant bank 
and alleged the check should not have been paid to Olympus 
Heating because it did not contain the endorsement of both 
payees. The trial court granted a summary judgment in favor 
of the Plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Utah, in affirming 
that judgment, said: 
The nature of a check is an order by its maker to 
its bank or depository that the face amount be 
paid to the payee he designates, and it is noticed 
to anyone accepting the check that the signature 
of all payees are required. This requirement is 
just as binding on the drawee bank as upon anyone 
else. For examples of cases which well illustrate 
this principle are Crahe v Mercantile Trust and 
Savings Loan, 129 N.E. 120 and Midland Savings and 
Loan Company v Tradesmen National Bank of Oklahoma 
City, 5 7 F. 2d 686 (C.C.A. Tenth). 
Consistent with that reasoning and in harmony with 
our view of the law, the Defendant, Bank of Salt 
Lake, having failed to obtain the endorsement of 
both payees, is likewise liable to Pacific Metals on 
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the check but the Plaintiff, of course, is limited 
to one recovery of its money. (Emphasis added). 
Id. 503. 
In the instant case, there is no question but that the 
negotiable instrument was properly endorsed by both joint payees. 
The Plaintiff contended that the funds were paid to one payee, 
Carl Harrison, and that such funds should have been paid directly 
to both payees. 
The Appellant respectfully submits that the law only 
requires the endorsement of both payees, and not that the 
negotiable instrument be paid directly to both payees. This 
contention is supported in the case of Continental Bank and Trust 
Company v People's National Bank and Trust Company, 217 Pa. Super. 
371, 274 A. 549 (1970). In that case the bank had paid a negotiable 
instrument to one of two joint payees without obtaining the 
endorsement of the other payee. However, in the dictum of the 
opinion the court concluded that if the negotiable instrument 
had been properly endorsed by both joint payees, the sum could 
be paid to either payee. The court said: 
Section 4-401 (1) of the code provides that a bank 
may charge against its customer's account only items 
that are 'properly payable1. Without the supplier's 
endorsement the item was not 'properly payable'. 
Cf. Pacific Metals Company v Tracy-Collins Bank and 
Trust Company, 21 U. 2d 400, 446 P. 2d 203 (1968). 
Thus Continental had no right to charge its customer's 
account and was liable to its customers for the amount 
of the item. Continental Bank and Trust Company v 
Philadelphia National Bank, 92 Monpg. Cty. L. Rep. 35, 
-16-
38 (1969). See Pacific Metals Company v Tracy-Collins 
Bank and Trust Company, Supra. However, if both 
endorsements had been obtained, the item would have 
been 'properly payable1 when it was presented to 
Continental. In that case Continental could have 
charged its customer's account without incurring 
liability. People's failure to require the additional 
endorsement thus resulted in Continental's liability 
to its depository. (Emphasis added). Id. 550. 
In the case at bar the check issued by Pharos Enterprises 
was payable to "F. Robertson and C. Harrison" as joint payees. 
The check was properly endorsed by both payees but was sub-
sequently returned for insufficient funds. Pharos Enterprises 
then deposited a cashiers check with Commercial Security Bank 
in order to make the original check good. During transmission 
of the funds by wire, an error apparently was made in changing 
the word "and" to "or". Frank Robertson contended that because 
of the error in wiring funds from Appellant's bank to the Bank of 
Idaho , the funds were erroneously paid to Carl Harrison. Appellant 
submits that the error made in this case in changing the word "and" 
to "or" had no material affect upon the transaction because the 
negotiable instrument was properly endorsed by both joint payees. 
Since the original check was properly endorsed, the proceeds could 
be paid to either of the joint payees. The fact that the check 
was returned for insufficient funds did not void or cancel the 
check. A new check was not issued to replace the original check. 
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The cashiers check which was deposited by Pharos Enterprises at 
Appellant's bank was designed to cover and insure that the original 
check would be paid in full. Assuming arguendo that the error had 
not occurred, the negotiable instrument would have been paid either 
to Carl Harrison or Frank Robertson, because the negotiable instrumen 
was properly endorsed by both parties. The error did not affect the 
payment of the negotiable instrument. The negotiable instrument wou] 
have been paid to either party upon proper endorsement, regardless 
of the error. 
We further point out that delivery of a check to one of 
two payees is tantamount to delivery to both. See Gillespie v Riley 
Management Corporation, (Illinois) 301 N.E. 2d 506 (1973). 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit the judgment entered in favor of 
Plaintiff and against Defendant should be reversed and/or a new 
trial granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RICHARD L. STINE of and for 
Olmstead, Stine and Campbell 
Attorney for Appellant 
Commercial Security Bank 
2650 Washington Boulevard 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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